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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL RESTRIC
TIONS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT: To SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK?
HAIG

V.

AGEE,

453

U.S.

280 (1981).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution jealously guards the individual
liberties that its drafters deemed essential to the operation of a dem
ocratic society. Individual liberties such as speech, religion, press,
and assembly, are set out expressly in the text of the first amend
ment. 1 Other rights, such as privacy and personhood,2 have been
included in the list of individual liberties, not through direct expres
sion in the Constitution but by judicial interpretation. 3
The right to travel, both domestically and internationally, is one
right not given direct expression in a constitutional amendment. 4
The tests that the United States Supreme Court will apply to deter
mine the extent of protection afforded an individual's right to travel
will depend upon whether one is traveling domestically or interna
tionally. For example, the Supreme Court has long held that there is
a constitutional right to domestic interstate travel,5 and that the right
is virtually unqualified. 6 On the other hand, the Court has yet to
make an absolute determination of the degree of constitutional pro
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
2. The labels "privacy" and "personhood" have been employed generically by Pro
fessor Tribe ,in his discussions of the right to education, free choice of vocation, sexual
preference, travel, and control over one's own body. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW 886-1135 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE].
3. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (statute prohibiting abortion except
when necessary to save the life of the mother struck down as an infringement on a wo
man's right to privacy); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (persons seeking a
divorce but who are unable to pay court fees cannot be denied access to state courts);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute restricting the right of married
persons to use contraceptive devices struck down); see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-689 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK].
4. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 666; L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 953.
5. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43
44 (1868).
6. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. I, 4 n.6 (1978) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971) and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966».
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tection to be afforded persons who travel beyond the political bound
aries of the United States. 7
In Haig v. Agee,S the Supreme Court was confronted with the
question of what degree of constitutional protection should be af
forded a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer's right to
travel throughout the world when the object of his travel was to dis
seminate information critical of, and possibly damaging to, CIA op
erations. 9 This question was summarily addressed by the Court in
Agee after the Court had affirmatively decided that the President,
acting through the Secretary of State (Secretary), has the authority to
revoke a passport on the ground that the holder's activities abroad
are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national se
curity or foreign policy of the United States.lO
This note will focus on the constitutional questions raised by the
revocation of Philip Agee's passport for his activities in foreign coun
tries. In the context of the constitutional questions raised in Agee, it
becomes clear that the constitutional right of an American citizen to
travel abroad must inevitably compete with the broad power of the
national government in the international arena. 1 1 The Court's hold
ing in Agee is based on an analysis of three prior passport cases:
Zemel v. Rusk, 12 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 13 and Kent v. Dul
7. In both Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958), the Court intimated that international travel is to be afforded the protection of the
fifth amendment, while in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the Court
suggested that in certain situations, the right to international travel may be afforded first
amendment protection. See notes 75-143 infra and accompanying text for a full discus
sion of Zemel, Kent, and Aptheker.
8. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
9. Respondent Philip Agee's disclosures of CIA operatives and agents have ap
peared in a variety offorms. Agee's first book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (1975), is
a detailed account of his years as a CIA agent operating undercover in Latin America.
In two later publications, Agee, in collaboration with others, detailed the operations of
the CIA in Western Europe and Africa by including in his books a "Who's Who" section
complete with names, biographies, locations, covers, and assignments. DIRTY WORK:
THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978); DIRTY WORK 2: THE
CIA IN AFRICA (E. Ray, W. Schapp, K. Van Meter, & L. Wolf eds. 1979).
Agee also held several news conferences similar to the one held in Havana, Cuba
during July 1978, where Agee said that he and others would set up a global research
group to scrutinize all CIA activities. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1978, at 7, col. 1. Finally, the
editor of the British journal Time Out indicated that Philip Agee "worked with them
preparing a series of articles identifying and publishing names of 'senior' spies at the
American Embassy in London." N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
10. 453 U.S. at 306.
11. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 666.
12. 381 U.S. I (1965).
13. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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les,14 each of which involved the overlapping rights of speech or as
sociation and travel.
The Court attempted to minimize the impact ofAgee by rooting
its decision in the administrative law issue concerning the extent to
which power may be delegated by Congress to the Secretary. IS
Agee's passport, however, was revoked because of the threat to na
tional security posed by his speech and publications: two areas tra
ditionally afforded protection by the first amendment. 16 The
question to be considered is whether the Court erred in failing to
address all first amendment aspects of Agee.
This note also will address the question of whether, at mini
mum, the Court should have explored the possibility of affording the
injured individual greater constitutional protection in situations in
which the right to free speech has been violated under the pretext of
regulating the right to travel abroad. The Agee Court's failure to
give adequate consideration to these issues has granted to the Secre
tary virtually unlimited authority to revoke or deny passports. I? The
exercise of such authority not only interferes with the right to travel,
but also infringes upon the first amendment rights of speech, press,
and association.
II.
A

AGEE

Facts and Procedural History

The facts of Agee were not in dispute. ls Between 1957 and
1968, Agee held a position of trust with the CIAI9 Agee's position
required him to receive training in covert intelligence gathering and
in methods used to protect identities of intelligence operatives and
sources working for the United States. 20 While serving in under
cover assignments abroad, Agee developed highly confidential rela
tionships with persons responsible for supplying the CIA with
intelligence information on a continual basis; many of these opera
tives still are functioning as sources for the CIA21
The twelve years Agee spent in the employ of the CIA had a
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Brief for
20.
21.

357 U.S. 116 (1958).
453 U.S. at 289-306.
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 576-734.
See text accompanying notes 144-92 infra.
453 U.S. at 287 & n.ll.
Brief for Petitioner at 2, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Petitioner].
453 U.S. at 283.
Id. Throughout Agee's clandestine career in Latin America he was employed
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profound effect on his attitudes toward the role of the United States
and the CIA in the Third World. Agee initially favored the CIA's
policies and methods in Latin America because the articulated pur
pose was to enable reform minded governments to gain a foothold. 22
But Agee gradually came to the conclusion that the CIA's policies
perpetuated the division between the rich and the poor, in some in
stances to the distinct advantage of United States businesses. 23
Agee's disillusionment with the policies of the CIA continued until
finally, on October 3, 1974, he conducted the first of a series of press
conferences designed to inform the world of his campaign to disrupt
and destroy the CIA. 24 At the last of these conferences orchestrated
by the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an arm of the AFL-CIO. N.Y.
Times, July 9, 1974, at 27, col. l.
As a prerequisite to employment with the CIA, Agee signed a contract which re
quired that he not discuss or publish, without prior approval, "any information or mate
rial relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during
or after the term of [his) employment. ..." Brief for Petitioner at 3, supra note 19.
Agee's employment contract with the CIA was identical to the contract which the Court
examined in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). In Snepp, the question was the
validity of a constructive trust imposed on the profits of Snepp's book which told of his
experiences while in the employ of the CIA. See also Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506
(D.D.C. 1980).
Although the civil action against Agee for disseminating CIA information produced
a decision which enjoined any future uncensored writing, id. at 509, Agee was subse
quently informed by the Justice Department that criminal prosecution under the Espio
nage Act, 18 U.S.c. §§ 792-799 (1976), would not be forthcoming because no ground for
prosecution could be found. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
22. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
23. Id. Agee's disillusionment was fostered by the belief that the CIA's main role
was to "keep the lid" on fledgling counter-insurgency movements in Latin America and
on the more prominent counter-insurgency movements in Vietnam. Agee's analysis of
the CIA's role led him to believe that the liberal reform theories espoused by the CIA
were merely rhetoric; a disguise for "American imperialism." Id. For a more detailed
account of Agee's ideological transformation, see P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA
DIARY (1975).
24. The text of the first press release from London read:
Today, I announced a new campaign to fight the United States CIA wher
ever it is operating. This campaign will have two main functions: First, to ex
pose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them
out of the countries where they are operating; secondly, to seek within the
United States to have the CIA abolished.
This effort to identify CIA people in foreign countries has been going on
for some time . . . . (Today's) list was compiled by a small group of Mexican
comrades whom I trained to follow the comings and goings of CIA people
before I left Mexico City.
Similar lists of CIA people in other countries are already being compiled
and will be announced when appropriate. We invite participation in this cam
paign from all those who strive for social justice and national dignity.
Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnOil, J., dissenting), rev'd
sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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by Agee,25 Louis Wolf, one of Agee's collaborators, named fifteen
individuals as CIA agents operating in Jamaica. 26 One week after
Wolfs publicized announcement, the homes of two named individu
als were attacked. 27
To carry out his program of .disruption, it was necessary for
Agee to travel to several countries. He first singled out a target coun
try and, upon arrival, consulted with sources and contacts known to
him from his prior service in the CIA.28 Thereafter, Agee began a
recruitment and training program to acquaint his sympathizers with
CIA techniques and clandestine operations. Agee's avowed purpose
for using these techniques was to expose the "cover" of CIA employ
ees and sources. 29
In December 1979, pursuant to sections 51.70(b)(4) and 51.7l(a)
to title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations,30 the Secretary re
voked Agee's passport by delivering an explanatory notice 31 to Agee
in West Germany.32 Agee waived his right to a hearing33 and, in
25. Brief for Petitioner at 125a, supra note 19.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 126a-27a.
28. 453 U.S. at 284.
29. Id. CIA Deputy Director for Operations, John N. McMahon, indicated that
"Mr. Agee. . . is perceived abroad as a highly credible source. Thus Mr. Agee's efforts
to use this privileged information. . . disrupted the activities of the CIA. [I)f he contin
ues these efforts it will certainly place the lives and safety of American officials in jeop
ardy." Brief for Petitioner at 112a, supra note 19.
30. The regulations state that: "A passport may be refused in any case in which
. . . the Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or are
likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United
States." 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1981). In addition, "A passport may be revoked, re
stricted, or limited where . . . the national would not be entitled to issuance of a new
passport under § 51.70." 22 C.F.R. § 5 1.7 I (a) (1981).
31. The notice read in part:
The Department of State has requested the Consulate to inform you that
the Department has revoked Passport No. Z3007741 issued to you on March 30,
1978 under the provisions of Section 51.71(a) of Title 22, Code of Federal Reg
ulations.
The Department's action is predicated upon a determination made by the
Secretary under the provisions of Section 51.70(b)(4) that your activities abroad
are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the
foreign policy of the United States. . . . Your stated intention to continue such
activities threatens additional damage of the same kind.
You are advised of your right to a hearing under Sections 51.80 through
5l.l05 of the Regulations.
Petitioner's Brief at 120a, supra note 19.
32. 453 U.S. at 286. Agee took up residence in West Germany after his deporta
tion from Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. See DIRTY WORK: THE CIA IN
WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 9, at 286-300.
33. 453 U.S. at 287. The State Department was prepared to hold an administrative
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stead, filed suit against the Secretary in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. 34 Agee alleged, inter alia, that
section 51.70(b)(4) was impermissibly overbroad and that the revo
cation of his passport violated both his fifth amendment liberty inter
est in the right to travel abroad and his first amendment right to
criticize the govemment. 35 Agee moved for summary judgment on
the question of the Secretary's authority to promulgate the regula
tions and on the constitutional claims. 36 Solely for the purposes of
the motion, Agee conceded the Government's factual averments37
and the claim that his activities were causing or were likely to cause
damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United
States. 38 After an analysis of Kent, Zemel, and the Passport Act of
1926,39 Judge Gesell determined that the Passport Act does not grant
the Secretary unbridled discretion to revoke or deny passports. 40 In
addition, Judge Gesell found that Congress had neither expressly
nor impliedly authorized the Secretary to promulgate the challenged
regulation. 41 The Court granted Agee's motion for summary judg
ment and, in doing so, found it unnecessary to consider the constitu
tional questions. 42
The district court's decision was affirmed in Agee v. Muskie .43
hearing in West Germany on five days notice in accordance with 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.80
51.89 (1981). 453 U.S. at 287 & n.9.
34. 453 U.S. at 287.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 22 U.S.C. § 21 I (a) (1976). The Passport Act states in relevant part: "The Sec
retary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued,
and verified . . . . and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports." Id.
40. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 730 (D.D.C.), ajf'd sub nom. Agee v. Muskie,
629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
41. Id. at 732.
42. Id. Generally, the federal courts will not pass on a constitutional question if a
construction may be given to a regulation or statute by which the constitutional issue
may be avoided. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23,27 (1980); Driscoll v. Edison Light
& Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 115 (1939); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Uti!. Corp., 300
U.S. 55, 75-76 (1937).
43. 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
For a discussion of Agee v. Muskie, see Comment, The CIA Responds to its Black Sheep:
Censorship and Passport Revocation--The Cases of Philip Agee, 13 CONN. L. REV. 317
(1981); Case Comment, Administrative Law-Passports May Not Be Revoked.for National
Security and Foreign Policy Reasons Without Congressional Authorization--Agee v. Mus
kie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 508 (1981); Recent Develop
ments, Constitutional Law: Authority of Secretary of State to Revoke Passports-Agee v.
Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Muskie v. Agee, 49
U.S.L.W. 3211 (Oct. 7, 1980),22 HARV. INT'L L.l. 187 (1981).
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Again finding it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question,44
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that section S1.70(b)(4) was promulgated by the Secretary and en
forced against Agee without congressional authorization. 45
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision46 and
held that the policy announced in the challenged regulation was
"sufficiently substantial and consistent" with past administrative
practice to conclude that Congress tacitly approved it. 47 As a result,
the Court concluded that the constitutional claims were without
merit. 48

B. Rationale
Prior to determining the validity of Agee's constitutional claims,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, focused on the Secre
tary's authority to promulgate sections S1.70(b)(4) and S1.71(a)49 in
light of the Passport Act. 50 The Passport Act does not expressly
grant the Secretary the authority to deny or revoke passports. 51
Therefore, in order to find the Secretary's regulation valid, the Court
had to find implied congressional approval. To do so in the face of
congressional silence, it was necessary to find an "administrative
practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the conclu
sion that Congress had [acquiesced to the practice and] implicitly
approved it."52 In Agee, the Court reformulated the test and found
44. 629 F.2d at 87 n.9.
45. Id. at 87. The court did not find it necessary to uphold the regulation on the
ground that some people may consider Agee's conduct to border on treason. The court
said, "We are bound by the law as we find it." Id.
The Passport Act of 1926 does not grant the Secretary of State the express authority
to promulgate regulations which would enable him to revoke passports. See note 39
supra. Absent express authority, the court must find a "sufficiently substantial and con
sistent administrative practice" to show implied congressional approval. See notes 52-53
infra and accompanying text. In Agee v. Muskie, the court found neither. 629 F.2d at 87.
46. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Chief Justice Burger stayed the judgment of the court of
appeals on July 22, 1980. Agee moved to vacate the stay, but, upon the Court's grant of
certiorari, Agee's motion was denied. Muskie v. Agee, 449 U.S. 818, affd sub nom Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
47. 453 U.S. at 306.
48. !d.
49. See note 30 supra.
50. 453 U.S. at 289-306.
51. !d. at 290. See note 39 supra.
52. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 12 (1965). The sufficiently substantial and consis
tent administrative practice test was first enunciated in Zemel. This author has found no
other case law which defines these terms, nor has the Burger Court had occasion to pass
on its validity. See Case Comment, supra note 43, at 514.
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that the policy announced in the challenged regulation had im
pliedly been approved by Congress. 53
The "sufficiently substantial and consistent" administrative
practice test, first articulated in Zemel, was given content by an ex
amination of prior passport cases and legislative history. 54 Although
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court reviewed the same cases
and legislative history to determine whether the Passport Act im
pliedly granted the Secretary authority to promulgate the challenged
regulation, the courts came to different conclusions. 55 This divergent
reading of the passport cases evidently was based on other consider
ations not articulated in either opinion. The Supreme Court major
ity in Agee held that the Secretary's passport regulations were
impliedly consented to by Congress,56 thus, it apparently did not find
troublesome the task of gleaning intention from congressional si
53. 453 U.S. at 306. In his dissent, Justice Brennan points out that the sufficiently
substantial and consistent test as set out in Zemel requires that it relate to an administra
tive practice and not an administrative policy or construction as was determined by the
. majority. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Apparently this means that the Govern
ment's burden is lighter if it has to demonstrate that a policy or construction of a statute
or regulation has been consistently adhered to as opposed to the necessity of demonstrat
ing that the policy was given content by showing a consistent practice.
Justice Brennan goes on to state that "Kent unequivocally states that mere construc
tion by the Executive-no matter how longstanding and consistent-is not sufficient."
Id. (emphasis in original). The test requires more than acquired discretion on the part of
the Secretary; it requires exercise of the discretion. Id. at 315.
The majority contends that "it would be anomalous to fault the Government be
cause there were so few occasions to exercise the announced policy and practice . . . it
suffices that the Executive has 'openly asserted' the power at issue." Id. at 303.
Justice Brennan responded by stating that:
. (N)o one is 'faulting' the Government because there are only a few occasions
when it has seen fit to deny or revoke passports for foreign policy or national
security reasons, ... (but] the Executive's authority to revoke passports touches
an area fraught with important Constitutional rights, and that the Court should
therefore 'construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.'
Id. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129). See Ex
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944).
54. 453 U.S. at 291-306.
55. Compare 453 U.S. 280 (1981) with 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
56. 453 U.S. at 306. In another passport case the Secretary of State sought to deny
passports to five United States citizens who desired to go on fact-finding trips through
China, Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Syria. The court, in attempting to de
termine the extent of the Secretary's authority in light of congressional silence in the
Passport Act said that "(g]leaning intention from Congressional silence is under the best
of circumstances an elusive task. . . the soft support of silence from Congress does not
permit an inference that it has authorized executive curtailment of the constitutionally
protected 'liberty' of travel to non-restricted areas ... ." Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940,
946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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lence. 57 Once the Court determined that it was within the Secre
tary's authority to apply his regulation to Agee, the Court then was
obliged to respond to Agee's allegations that he was denied his con
stitutional rights. 58
The Court based its constitutional holding on the premise that
Agee's conduct was damaging to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States. 59 While it is true that Agee's conduct
included traveling from country to country and recruiting foreign
personnel for anti-CIA operations, the Court also chose to focus on
Agee's disclosures at press conferences and in print. 60 Speaking at a
press conference or writing an article or book may well be consid
ered conduct, but this conduct is inextricably tied to speech and press
rights that fall under the first amendment. 61 The Court, however,
refused to consider this argument and, instead, held that the revoca
tion of Agee's passport was clearly an "inhibition of [his] 'action'
rather than of [his] speech."62 This proposition appears inconsistent
with the Court's finding that the revocation of Agee's passport rested
in part on the content of his disclosures of intelligence operations
and undercover personne1. 63 By raising this point, the Court under
cut its determination that the Secretary attempted solely to restrict
conduct. The Court apparently raised the question of Agee's speech
in dicta to analogize the facts of Agee to a hypothetical situation
presented in Near v. Minnesota. 64 In Near, the Court determined
that the Government could prohibit publication of the sailing dates
of transport ships and the location of American troops65 because the
publication could be damaging to national security.66
57. In trying to mold the historical evidence to show congressional acquiescence in
the form of congressional silence, the Supreme Court has impliedly set out a principle
which states that "only the clearest of such evidence will permit this Court to consider
Congressional silence to be a substitute for explicit and affirmative legislative action in
limiting the free exercise of important [constitutional) rights." Woodward v. Rogers, 344
F. Supp. 974, 985 (D.D.C. 1972), qlf'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, e.g., Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Exparte Endo, 323
U.S. 283 (1944).
58. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
59. 453 U.S. at 304-05.
60. Id. at 308.
61. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 688-817.
62. 453 U.S. at 309 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 16). See notes 183-92 infra
and accompanying text.
63. 453 U.S. at 308.
64. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
65. Id. at 716 (noting exceptions to the principle that prohibits prior restraint).
66. There is a serious question, however, as to whether the prior restraint exception
noted in Near is applicable to Agee. The prior restraint discussion in Near was part of a
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Having disposed of the need for a first amendment analysis that
would have required support from Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 67
the Court proceeded to find that the right of international travel,
when not tied to other constitutional rights, is no more than a "lib
erty" interest which may be regulated within the bounds of fifth
amendment due process. 68
In applying the fifth amendment standard of review, the Court
found that restricting Agee's travel by revoking his passport was the
only avenue open to the government to limit his activities. 69 With
out other alternatives, this method was rationally related to the
"[p]rotection of the foreign policy of the United States ... a gov
larger discussion by the Court as to whether a publication known as "The Saturday
Press" could continue to print articles charging that a Jewish gangster was in control of
various organized crime activities in Minnesota. Id. at 704. Chief Justice Hughes em
ployed the "troop movement" hypothetical to illustrate that there are extreme situations
in which prior restraint is constitutionally permissible. He concluded that the exception
was not applicable in Near. Id. at 716.
In his dissent in Agee, Justice Brennan pointed out that Near is only applicable
when the activity "must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea." 453 U.S. at 320, n.lO
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring». One might also question whether Agee's publi
cations and press conferences during a time when the United States was not involved in a
war is analogous to the hypothetical situation in Near, since the publication of troop
movements during a time of war would have an extreme and immediate impact.
Justice Brennan also argued that Agee's concessions to the Government's factual
averments were merely for the purpose of challenging the facial validity of the Secre
tary's regulation and not for establishing their application to this case. It is only when
the facts are established that the Court can determine whether they fall within the class of
cases which follow the Near exception. Id.
Furthermore, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the
Court noted that the extremely narrow class of cases where the first amendment ban on
prior restraint may be overridden can arise only when the nation "is at war." Id. at 726
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919».
When Agee's passport was revoked the United States was not officially "at war" although
the Iranian hostage crisis was well under way.
67. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). Aptheker was a travel restriction case in which the Court
employed a first amendment analysis because of the infringement on associational rights
created by the travel restriction. See text accompanying notes 97-126 infra.
68. 453 U.S. at 307. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 175-76 (1978);
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1,4 n.6 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 n.l,
666 n.23 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 666 n.23 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 14 (1965); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27
(1958). But if. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912 & n.55 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating
that the "freedom to travel at home and abroad without unreasonable governmental re
striction is a fundamental constitutional right of every American citizen" although the
"constitutional source of the right is not yet settled").
69. 453 U.S. at 308.
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emmental interest of great importance."7o
The crux of the constitutional problem, however, is brought
forth in Justice Brennan's dissent. 71 While conceding that Agee is
hardly a model representative of our nation, Justice Brennan
stressed that the majority's decision applied not only to Agee, whose
activities could be perceived as harmful to national security, but also
to other citizens who may disagree with national foreign policy and
express their views.72 Justice Brennan did not undertake a full anal
ysis of the constitutional problem because he would have upheld the
decision of the lower courts on the administrative issue. 73 Wishing,
however, to have his position fully understood, he said, "[t]he Court
seems to misunderstand the prior precedents of this Court, for Agee's
speech is undoubtedly protected by the Constitution."74 It is open to
speculation whether the outcome of this case would have been differ
ent had the Court engaged in a first amendment analysis. The ques
tion to be asked here is whether the Court should have addressed
Agee's situation from a first amendment rather than a fifth amend
ment perspective.
70. Id. at 307. The Court also indicated the need to maintain confidentiality of
diplomatic, consular, and other officials who provide foreign policy and national security
information to the President. Id. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S.
304,320 (1936); accord, Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, III (1948); THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 432, 434-35 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
71. 453 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 319. At oral argument, Justice Brennan elicited a response from Solicitor
General McCree which led Justice Brennan to conclude that the "reach of the Secretary's
discretion is potentially staggering." Id. at 319 n.9. Justice Brennan asked whether the
Secretary could refuse to issue a passport to an American citizen who wished to travel to
El Salvador if it were determined that the trip's sole purpose was to denounce the United
States policy in support of the ruling junta. McCree responded in the affirmative, adding
that the "freedom of speech that we enjoy domestically may be different from that that
we can exercise in this [international] context." Id.
In addition, the Secretary's regulatory power can be triggered upon fear of possible
harm to national security or foreign policy. Obviously, there is a significant difference
between the concepts with "foreign policy" being much broader in scope. In general,
"national security" may be defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values
from external threats. It is generally considered to be a more specialized subarea of a
country's overall foreign policy. See generally II INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 40-45 (D. Sills ed. reprint 1972). On the other hand, "foreign
policy" is a generic term encompassing the institutional and individual behavior of a
government in its political, economic, social, and military relations with other govern
ments. See generally 5 id. at 530-35. See also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 623-34 (A. DeConde ed. 1978) for a series of essays covering a variety of specific
topics under the foreign policy heading including "national security."
73. 453 U.S. at 320 n.1O (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Id. While Justice Brennan's unequivocal statement may be open to argument,
it does raise the valid point that there is an important first amendment problem in this
case that should have been discussed in full by the majority.
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THE PASSPORT RESTRICTION CASES

Travel-A F!fth Amendment Right?

Kent, Aptheker, and Zemef7 5 represent the foundation of what
has become a mountain of litigation in the lower courts76 concerning
an American citizen's ability to travel outside the political bounda
ries of the United States. Prior to Kent, the Supreme Court had not
confronted the question of what limits should be imposed on the use
of passports to protect the interests of the United States from the
activities of citizens traveling abroad.
In Kent v. Du/les,77 the Court was confronted with a situation
involving two American citizens, Rockwell Kent and Dr. Walter
Briehl,78 both alleged members of the Communist Party. Shortlyaf
ter Kent applied for a passport to attend a conference in Helsinki,
Finland, he was informed that the issuance of a passport to him was
precluded by section 51.135 to title 22 of the Code of Federal Regu
lations. 79 The Secretary charged that Kent was a Communist with a
75. See notes 12-14 supra. In each of these cases, the fifth amendment is discussed
either in dicta or as a basis for the decision.
76. Since the focus here is restricted to the constitutional issues raised by Agee, it is
beyond the scope of this note to engage in a full discussion of all the lower court right to
travel cases, although where relevant, selected cases will be discussed. See generally Ber
rigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d
905 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959); Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774
(9th Cir. 1958); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Woodward v. Rog
ers, 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972); MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa.
1964), qffd, 344 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914
(S.D. Cal. 1957); Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson,
106 F. Supp. 445 (D. D.C. 1952).
77. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
.
78. The facts relating to Briehl are identical to those relating to Kent. Briehl, a
psychiatrist, applied for a passport, but like Kent, was denied when he refused to supply
an affidavit pertaining to his alleged membership in the Communist Party. Kent v. Dul
les, 357 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1958). The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and
heard both cases together. Kent v. Dulles, 355 U.S. 881 (1957) (grant of certiorari).
79. 357 U.S. at 117. The Kenl Court set out the relevant portions of 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.135 which states:
In order to promote the national interest by assuring that persons who sup
port the world Communist movement of which the Communist Party is an inte
gral unit may not, through use of United States passports, further the purposes
of that movement, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate
return to the United States, shall be issued to:
(a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have re
cently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to warrant the
conclusion-not otherwise rebutted by the evidence-that they continue to act
in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of the Communist Party;
(b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the
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consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line. In
accordance with the regulation, Kent was required to submit an affi
davit stating whether he was a Communist. 80
Kent refused to submit the affidavit on the ground that the re
quirement was unconstitutional.8 1 Upon receiving Kent's response,
the State Department determined that it would take no further ac
tion on Kent's passport application until the required affidavit was
submitted. 82
The Court invalidated the Secretary's action, analogizing it to
past administrative practice cases relating to travel restrictions. The
review of past administrative practice revealed that unless the pass
port applicant participated in illegal conduct or was either not a citi
zen of, or not loyal to the United States, there could be no
restriction. 83 Absent an express delegation of power to the Secretary
from Congress authorizing passport denials or revocations,84 the
Court did not wish to impute this motive to Congress without a long
standing administrative practice. The Court felt that to do so would
give the Secretary unbridled discretion over travel regulation, thus
allowing him to deny, grant, or revoke passports for any substantive
reason he may choose. 85
Having found that the Secretary had gone beyond his authority
Communist Party, who engage in activities which support the Communist
movement under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion-not other
wise rebutted by the evidence-that they have engaged in such activities as a
result of direction, domination, or control exercised over them by the Commu
nist movement;
(c) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the
Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all
the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which will ad
vance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of
advancing that movement.
357 U.S. at 117-18 n.!. See also Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 84 n.3 (regulation was
struck down by Supreme Court in Kent).
80. 357 U.S. at 118-19.
8!. Id. Like Kent, Briehl also refused to submit an affidavit charging: (I) that his
political affiliation was irrelevant to his right to a passport; (2) that "every American
citizen has the right to travel regardless of politics"; and (3) that the burden was on the
State Department to prove illegal activities by Briehl. Id. at 120.
82. Id. at 119.
83. Id. at 127. The Court found that past administrative practice relating to Com
munists was scattered and not consistently of one pattern. Id. at 128. It must be borne in
mind that Philip Agee's citizenship was not disputed, nor were there grounds to charge
him with criminal activity. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
84. See note 39 supra.
85. 357 U.S. at 128. In effect this is what Justice Brennan believed was the result of
the Court's decision in Agee. 453 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

462

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REViEW

[Vol. 4:449

in denying passports to Kent and Briehl, the Court was precluded
from considering the constitutional questions lying beneath the sur
face. This did not prevent Justice Douglas from setting out in dicta
the relationship between the right to travel abroad and specific pro
visions of the Constitution. 86 Justice Douglas expressly connected
the right to travel abroad to the liberty interest protected by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. 87 Thus, any restriction on the
right to travel abroad is subject to a test of "reasonableness" in light
of the important state interest the restriction is designed to protect.
Other language in Justice Douglas' opinion pointed to the possi
bility of placing the right to travel abroad at the periphery of the first
amendment when the situation so requires. Justice Douglas noted
that freedom of movement has larger social values. 88 In Kent, the
Court was confronted with more than a travel restriction case be
cause the parties' beliefs and associations were involved. Freedom
of movement was restricted solely because Kent and Briehl refused
to allow inquiries into their beliefs and associations. 89 Justice Doug
las' allusion to possible first amendment violations when travel
abroad is restricted was more clearly articulated and developed in
later opinions,90 but the groundwork for a first amendment analysis
was established in Kent.

B.

Travef.-A First Amendment Right?

By deciding in favor of Kent and Briehl on the administrative
issue, the Court in Kent was able to avoid the difficult constitutional
issues that finally surfaced inAptheker. 91 InAptheker, the Court was
confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of section 6 of
the Subversive Activities Control Act.92 Appellants Elizabeth Gur
86. 357 u.s. at 125-26 (dicta).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 126.
89. Id. at 130.
90. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,23-26 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520-21 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
91. 378 U.S. 500, 505-14 (1964).
92. 50 U.S.c. § 785 (1976). The Act states in relevant part:
(a) When a Communist organization . . . is registered, or there is in effect a
final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it shall be
unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice
that such organization is so registered or that such order has become
final
(I) to make application for a passport or the renewal of a passport,
to be issued or renewed by or under the authority of the United
States; or
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ley Flynn and Herbert Eugene Aptheker, were native citizens of the
United States holding valid United States passports. 93 On January
22, 1962, the Secretary revoked appellants' passports based solely on
the findings of the Board of Passport Appeals. 94
Appellants asked that the statute be declared unconstitutional
because, inter alia, it infringed on their constitutional liberty to travel
abroad in violation of the fifth amendment, and it abridged their
freedom of speech, press, and assembly in violation of the first
amendment. 95
Justice Goldberg expressly affirmed the dicta from Kent which
unequivocally stated that the right to travel abroad is an important
aspect of a citizen's liberty and therefore is guaranteed by the fifth
amendment. 96 To decide whether the restrictions on travel set out in
section 6 were too broad, the Court enunciated a four-part inquiry.
First, the Court must determine whether the person knows or be
lieves that the organization to which he belongs is a "Communist
action" or "Communist front" organization. 97 Second, the level of
the member's commitment to the organization must be scrutinized.
If the member lacks a firm commitment, there is no guarantee that
his travels will produce the activity Congress sought to contro1. 98
Third, there must be an inquiry into the purpose of the individual's
(2)

to use or attempt to use any such passport.

Id.

93. 378 U.S. at 502.
94. Id. at 503. The Board of Passport Appeals found that " 'at all material times
[appellants were members) of the Communist Party of the United States with knowledge
or notice that such organization had been required to register as a Communist organiza
tion under the Subversive Activities Control Act''' and therefore were in violation of
section 6 of the Act. Id. (quoting the final order of the Board of Passport Appeals).
95. Id. at 503-04.
96. Id. at 505.
97. Id. at 509-10. For support, the Court cited Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952), a case in which the state attempted to bar disloyal persons from its employ solely
on the basis of organizational membership without regard to their knowledge concerning
the organization to which they belonged. The Wieman Court concluded that to inhibit
freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of democratic expression at its source. The
Court reasoned that indiscriminate classification of innocent activity must fall as an arbi
trary assertion of power. Id. at 191.
98. 378 U.S. at 510. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.s. 232 (1957),
Justice Black said, "[a)ssuming that some members of the Communist Party . . . had
illegal aims and engaged in illegal activities, it cannot automatically be inferred that all
members shared their evil purposes or participated in their illegal conduct." Id. at 246.
One of the objections raised in Aplheker to section 6 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act is that it establishes an irrebuttable presumption that one who belongs to a
given organization will at all times adhere to and advance that organization's philosophy.
378 U.S. at 511.
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travel plans. Under section 6, not only is it a crime for a Communist
organization member to apply for a passport so that he may partici
pate in subversive activities, but it is also a crime for a Communist
organization member to apply for a passport so that he may visit a
sick relative, receive medical treatment, or travel abroad for any in
nocent purpose. 99 Finally, the Court must inquire into the congres
sional decisionmaking process to determine whether Congress chose
the least drastic means to achieve the objective of protecting national
security. 100
In responding to the Government's contention that one could
regain his passport by giving up his association with the organization
in question, Justice Goldberg announced that the first amendment
. freedom of association101 was implicated and held that section 6 was
unconstitutional on its face.102 In doing so, Justice Goldberg en
gaged in a first amendment "overbreadth" analysis, which seeks to
insure that when the government attempts to control or prevent ac
tivities that constitutionally may be regulated, the regulation does
not sweep unnecessarily broadly, thereby invading the area of pro
tected freedoms. 103
The Court in Aplheker chose to apply the overbreadth analysis
in an international travel case. Until this point, international travel
cases had required only a fifth amendment due process analysis,
thus, as a result of Aplheker, there was reason to believe that in con
sidering future international travel cases in which a regulation im
pinged on first amendment rights the Court would apply a strict first
amendment standard. One commentator concluded that in situa
tions in which a traveler's first amendment right is restricted, the
Court automatically should afford the traveler a higher degree of
protection under the first amendment. 104
Justice Goldberg's rationale in Aplheker, that freedom to travel
is closely related to freedom of speech and association,105 is based on
his view that a personal, rather than a property right is infringed
upon by the statute. Justice Goldberg cited both NAACP v. BUI
99. 378U.S.at511.
100. Id. at 512-13.
101. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2 at 700-10.
102. 378 U.S. at 508.
103. /d. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, (1964»; accord, Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
104. L. Turner, The Right to Travel and the Problem of Unenumerated Constitu
tional Rights 309 (1972) (unpublished dissertation on file at the University of California,
Los Angeles library).
lOs. 378 U.S. at 517.
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Ion 106 and Thornhill v. Alabama 107 in his discussion of how to ap
proach overbroad legislation that curtails a personal first
amendment right. Both Button and Thornhill indicated that when a
statute sweeps too broadly, thereby infringing on first amendment
rights in an attempt to regulate activities within the permissible
scope of government regulation, that statute may be struck down as
overbroad. lOS Thus in Aplheker, the irrebuttable presumption 109 cre
ated by the statute that all members of an organization necessarily
adhere to and advance the organization's philosophy, I 10 invalidated
the statute. Justice Goldberg further indicated that if a member of a
suspect organization applied for a passport to visit a sick relative
abroad, he would be guilty of a crime based merely upon his mem
bership in the suspect organization. II I InAplheker, it was within the
scope of the fifth amendment due process clause for the Government
to regulate travel abroad, but in finding that the facts in Aplheker
106. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). BUllon involved a challenge by the NAACP to a Vir
ginia statute which made it an offense for an organization such as the NAACP, its mem
bers, and its staff lawyers to associate for the purpose of defending those persons who had
claims relating to the infringement of their constitutional rights. Id. at 428. The Court
applied the first amendmen! overbreadth doctrine in reversing the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals' endorsement of the statute. The overbreadth doctrine was employed
to point out that a statute, if not narrowly drawn, may infringe upon or deter the exercise
of first amendment rights by those who are not the direct object of the regulation. Id. at
433-34.
107. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Thornhill, convicted for violating an Alabama statute that
made it a misdemeanor to loiter at a place of business without just cause, or to picket a
place of business for the purpose of hindering, delaying or interfering with such business,
challenged the statute on the ground that it deprived him of the "right of peaceful assem
blage," "the right of freedom of speech," and "the right to petition for redress." Id. at
91-93.
The Court stated that the statute did not aim specifically at evils within an allowable
area of state control, but swept within its ambit many activities which under ordinary
circumstances would constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press. "The exist
ence of such a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement
by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure,
results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might
reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Id. at 97-98.
108. NAACP v. B4tton, 371 U.S. at 432-33; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 97.
109. Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act establishes an irrebuttable
presumption that if members of a specified organization are given passports, they will
necessarily engage in activity detrimental to the security of the United States. 378 U.S. at
511. The statute in Aptheker could not be limited in a fashion similar to the statute in
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221 (1961) in which the Court interpreted a statute
imposing criminal penalties on organization members to apply only to "active members."
378 U.S. at 511 n.9. The Aptheker Court indicated that neither the words nor the legisla
tive history of section 6 allows such a construction. Id.
110. See note 92 supra.
111. 378 U.S. at 511. See note 98 supra.
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created a situation in which the travel restriction infringed upon a
first amendment right, the Court employed a first amendment, rather
than a fifth amendment, standard to invalidate the statute.
Justice Black concurred in the majority holding,ll2 but refused
to recognize that the due process clause of the fifth amendment alone
confers an unabridged constitutional right to trave1. l13 Rather, he
would have invalidated section 6 on three grounds. "4 The third
ground was that it denied freedom of speech, press, and association
as guaranteed by the first amendment. I 15
Justice Douglas, also concurring,"6 noted the importance of
freedom of domestic and international movement to the individual's
cultural, social, political, and economic activities. 117 He considered
freedom of movement the essence of a free society; therefore, if one
restricts travel, other first amendment rights may suffer. I IS
C.

Travel-Cutting Back on Constitutional Protection?

Prior to Zemel v. Rusk, 119 the Cuban missile crisis necessitated
that the Secretary declare invalid all outstanding passports for travel
to Cuba; passports held by persons already in Cuba were excepted.
Similar to the Court in Kent, the Zemel Court confronted a chal
lenge to an action by the Secretary allegedly authorized by the
broadly worded Passport Act. 120 The Court was faced with the ques
tion of whether there was a sufficiently substantial and consistent
administrative practice to warrant the conclusion that Congress had
implicitly approved the invalidation. 121 In distinguishing Kent, the
Court noted that in Kent, the Secretary refused to invalidate a pass
112. 378 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., concurring).
113. /d. at 518.
114. The first ground was that the Act was a bill of attainder, and the second, that
it violates the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment procedural protections. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 519 (Douglas, J., concurring).
117. /d. at 519-20.
118. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Clark argued that granting standing to
attack the statute on its face was improper because the standing exception applies only to
first amendment cases. Id. at 521-22 (Clark, J., dissenting). See note 166 infra. Obvi
ously Justice Clark is of the opinion that a first amendment analysis is inapposite to
questions concerning the right to travel abroad. He also felt that even if standing was
properly granted, section 6 of the Act was valid on its face because the remedy adopted
by Congress to control the spread of Communism and subversive ideas by restricting
travel was reasonable in relation to the Government's objective. 378 U.S. at 527 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
119. 381 U.S. I (1965).
120. See -note 39 supra.
121. 381 U.S. at 12.
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port because of characteristics peculiar to the appellant, while in
Zemel, the restriction was based on foreign policy considerations af
fecting all citizens. 122 After a review of past administrative prac
tice,123 the majority concluded that the Secretary had validly
exercised his authority to restrict. travel to selected areas of the
world. 124
Having reached this conclusion, the Court was obliged to con
sider the constitutionality of the Secretary's action. Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority, acknowledged the position taken in
Kent, reaffirmed in Aptheker, that the right to travel abroad deserves
protection as a liberty interest under the fifth amendment due pro
cess clause. 125 But he added a caveat indicating that there are cir
cumstances wherein this liberty interest could be inhibited. 126 Chief
Justice Warren weighed the government interests 127 and concluded
that where a travel restriction is "supported by the weightiest consid
erations of national security,"128 the travel restriction does not vio
late the fifth amendment. 129
The Zemel Court also rejected appellant's argument that the re
striction violated his first amendment rights to gather and dissemi
nate information. Chief Justice Warren distinguished both Kent and
Aptheker on the ground that the restrictions imposed on travel in
those cases were based on an individual's association with the Com
munist Party, 130 thus implying that the restriction on the right of as
sociation deserves greater scrutiny than the speech restriction in
Zemel. 131 While the Court recognized that restricting travel to Cuba
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id. at 7-12.
124. Id. at 13. Zemel spawned a new generation of passport cases involving area
restrictions. See Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d
280 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C.
Cir.), cerl. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959); Frank v. Herter, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Area restrictions are implemented to achieve three objectives: "(1) to seal off an area
because of peculiar, short term circumstances; (2) to promote national security; and (3) to
facilitate foreign relations." Comment, Judicial Review of Ihe RighI 10 Travel, 42 WASH.
L. REV. 873, 892 (1967).
125. 381 U.S. at 14.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 14-15. These interests were: (I) that Cuba was the only Communist
controlled territory in the Western Hemisphere; (2) that the goal of the Cuban govern
ment is to export its Communist revolution to the rest of Latin America; (3) that the
United States must act to protect the safety of its nationals traveling abroad. Id.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 15.
130. Id. at 16.
131. This may be an implicit recognition by.the Court that where a restriction on
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limited appellant's access to information and his ability to dissemi
nate that information upon his return to the United States, the re
striction in Zemel was labeled an "inhibition of action" not
protected by the first amendment as opposed to an inhibition of
speech, which is protected by the first amendment. 132 Therefore,
while the Court continued to recognize that a fifth amendment test
must be applied in factual situations similar to Zemel, it refused to
interpret the facts of the case to show an inhibition of rights falling
within the first amendment. 133
Chief Justice Warren concluded the discussion of the Secre
tary's authority to impose restrictions on travel to certain parts ofthe
world by citing United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. 134 for
the proposition that there have been numerous occasions where
Congress has chosen to allow the executive branch to exercise its
unrestricted judgment, or has permitted the executive branch to op
erate under standards that are more general than ordinarily re
quired. 135 Chief Justice Warren reasoned that this is especially true
in the area of foreign affairs where "Congress-in giving the Execu
tive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of necessity paint
with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic ar
eas."136 As the Passport Act does not grant to the executive unlim
ited authority in the area of foreign affairs relative to passports, the
Passport Act must take its content from the history of the adminis
trative practice associated with passport denials and revocations. 137
the right to travel inhibits a first amendment right, the Court may apply a stricter stan
dard of review.
132. 381 U.S. at 15. This dichotomy was the basis for rejecting the first amend
ment challenge in Agee. 453 U.S. at 304-06.
133. See notes 183-92 infra and accompanying text. One might suggest that both
Zemel and Agee were highly result-oriented due to the sensitive nature of the national
security issue involved, but the use of the conduct/speech dichotomy in Zemel, and in
Agee, does not offer a satisfying rationale for dismissing the first amendment issue. Id.
134. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
135. 381 U.S. at 17.
136. Id. Contra, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129. Regulation of "liberty" under
the fifth amendment must be pursuant to the law-making function of Congress, Y oungs
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952), and when activities such
as travel are involved, powers delegated by Congress to the Executive which curtail these
activities will be construed narrowly. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944).
While Congress may ordinarily delegate power under broad standards, the delega
tion must necessarily be narrow when fundamental rights are involved because deficien
cies connected with legislative directives to executive officers are more serious when
liberty and fundamental rights are at stake. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-75
(1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
137. 381 U.S. at 17-18.
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In Zemel, the Court found that past administrative practice was suf
ficient to validate the action of the Secretary.138
Justice Douglas, in his dissent,I39 stated that a government offi
cial cannot approve and disapprove of one's travel simply because
ideas please or offend the official or because some political objective
is served by restricting movement. 140 He further stated that allowing
Congress to paint with a "broad brush" ignores the principle
adopted in NAACP v. Alabama,'41 that government regulation may
not be achieved by unnecessarily broad means that invade the area
of protected freedoms. 142
The dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Zemel and the first
amendment analysis used in Aptheker support the proposition that
there are certain situations in which the right to travel is closely tied
to the first amendment and, if restricted, may unconstitutionally in
fringe upon rights acknowledged to fall within the protection of the
first amendment. 143
IV.

THE NEED FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Although Agee is not an exemplary member of our society, this
factor should not necessitate the automatic dismissal of his constitu
tional rights. Justice Brennan cautioned that "bad facts make bad
law,"'44 and that any attempt to fashion a decision on "bad facts"
always should take into consideration the potential ramifications of
tailoring a decision only to those facts.145 In discussing the conflict
between the Government's need to act decisively to safeguard the
national security and the individual's rights that may be infringed
upon by government action, the court of appeals indicated that when
the Government attempts to prevent a danger to society by restrict
ing individual rights, the security gained is illusory. This is because
the security is purchased at the cost of the surrender of protections
138. Id. at 18.
139. Id. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 26.
141. 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
142. 381 U.S. at 26.
143. Justice Douglas also reaffirmed the position he had taken in Kent, that the
right to converse with others, to observe social, physical, political, and other phenomena
abroad is inextricably tied to freedom of movement. Thus, he argued that freedom of
movement has "large social values." Id. at 24 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 126
(dicta».
144. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. See notes 18-34 supra and accompanying text.
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afforded individual rights. 146 While national security is an indispen
sible concern of the Government, individual liberties should not be
lightly disregarded. '47
The Supreme Court may have erred by not discussing fully the
arguments that Agee's first amendment freedoms of speech and press
were violated. '48 This is not to say that the outcome necessarily
would have been different if a strict first amendment standard of re
view had been applied: By avoiding the issue, however, the Court
left the door open for arbitrary action by the Secretary under section
51. 70(b)(4). As a result of Agee, the Secretary now has absolute dis
cretion to determine when activities are "causing or are likely to
cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the
United States."149
Agee's first amendment argument was based in part on
Aptheker, in which the Court invalidated an administrative regula
tion that was overbroad on its face. 150 An overbroad regulation is
one that could be employed by the Secretary not only at times when
there is documented proof of damage, but in any instance that may
fall within the Secretary's definition of danger to national security or
foreign policy.l5l The Court responded to Agee's argument by rely
ing on Califano v. Aznavorian, 152 in which it declared that the right to
travel abroad should be judged by a "rational basis test" that re
quires the regulation to be upheld so long as the travel restriction it
creates is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 153 The Agee
Court's reliance on Aznavorian for the proposition that all travel re
striction cases are governed by the fifth amendment rather than the
first amendment was misplaced. '54 Aznavorian involved the plight
146. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 P.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
Kissinger v. Halperin, 446 U.S. 951 (1980), ajf'd in part, cert. denied in part, 452 U.S. 713
(1981).
147. This is not to say that there are only a few situations where national security
interests should be paramount to individual rights. This statement is merely in response
to the Court's extreme view implicit in Agee that national security interests will always
outweigh individual rights.
148. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,23 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (dicta).
149. 22 C.P.R. § 51.70(b)(4). See note 40 supra. The effects of this regulation are
not limited to activities that might harm national security, but also include the broader
area of foreign policy. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
150. Brief for Respondent at 103, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Respondent).
151. See text accompanying notes 158-81 infra.
152. 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
153. Id. at 174.
154. The Aznavorian Court distinguished Kent, Zemel, and Aptheker: "The statu
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of a welfare recipient who was denied her statutory benefits because
she had traveled to Mexico and, due to an illness, remained there for
a period longer than allowed by the statute. 155 In A znavorian, there
was no indication that the statutory limitation on international travel
infringed on a right protected by the first amendment. 156 In Agee,
however, the fact that Agee's writing was curtailed raised a first
amendment issue.
The Court successfully avoided a first amendment analysis in
Agee by assuming that the rationale in Aznavorian was applicable
simply because both cases involved international travel. But the
facts in Aznavorian are inapposite to the facts in Agee.157 Thus, by
avoiding a first amendment analysis in Agee, the Court did not have
to demonstrate why the Secretary's· regulation was not overbroad on
its face. As a result, a potentially overbroad regulation was allowed
to stand.
A.

Overbreadth Analysis

Overbreadth analysis attempts to remedy a situation wherein a
statute, regulation, or ordinance on its face sweeps beyond the con
duct that it may properly regulate and begins to infringe upon rights
protected by the Constitution. ISS It is important to note that in over
breadth analysis the constitutional rights of the person challenging
the statute need not have been violated. 159 In Thornhill v. Ala
bama,160 relied on in Aptheker to invalidate section 6 of the Subver
sive Activities Control Act,161 the Court said that a statute
prohibiting all peaceful picketing "does not aim specifically at evils
tory provision in issue here does not have nearly so direct an impact on the freedom to
travel internationally as occurred in the Kent, Aptheker or Zemel cases. . . . It does not
limit the right to travel on grounds that may be in tension with the First Amendment."
Id. at 177.
155. Id. at 171-72.
156. Indeed, the Aznavorian Court implied that the statute in question had only an
incidental effect on international travel for "[i)t does not limit the availability or validity
of passports." Id. at 177; Note, Califano v. Aznavorian: Social Security Residence Re
qUirement f)oes Not Impair Right ofInternational Travel, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
101, 107 (1980). The statute in Aznavorian was designed to insure that an individual's
residence in the United States is genuine by denying welfare benefits to individuals who
have been out of the country for more than thirty consecutive days. 439 U.S. at 178. On
the other hand, the regulation in Agee was specifically designed to restrict travel with the
potential concomitant effect of infringing on other rights inextricably tied to travel.
157. See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra and notes 18-48 supra.
158. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 710-12.
159. See note 166 infta and accompanying text.
160. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
161. 378 U.S. at 516 (citingThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940».
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within the allowable area of State control but, on the contrary,
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circum
stances constitute an exercise of speech or the press."162
Agee attacked the Secretary's regulation on overbreadth
grounds. 163 He argued that his right to speak and publish was in
fringed upon by the application of a regulation aimed at controlling
his conduct abroad. Agee alleged that passport revocation was only
a vehicle to reach the actual target, his media activity exposing CIA
operatives, and that revocation was intended to deter him from at
tacking the policies of the Government and the CIA. He argued that
the regulation, drafted to curtail travel conduct, was so broad that it
could be used to infringe upon first amendment rights of others.
Agee further alleged that the regulation infringed upon his own first
amendment rights. 164
Factually, the situation in Agee is analogous to Aptheker be
cause in Aptheker the travel restriction also was employed as a
means to prevent certain individuals from exercising their rights of
association. 165 The restriction in Aptheker was overbroad because it
could have been used to deny passports to those whose travel abroad
was not a threat to the nation. The same is true of the regulation in
Agee. In addition, Aptheker also stands for the proposition that
Agee has standing to challenge the validity of the Secretary's regula
tion on overbreadth grounds. 166 Therefore, the issue the Court
should have reached in Agee was whether Agee's allegation of over
breadth could be asserted validly in light of recent first amendment
162. 310 u.s. at 97.
163. 453 U.S. at 287.
164. Id. at 306.
165. See text accompanying notes 91-111 supra.
166. A unique feature of Aptheker relates to the problem of standing to raise a
constitutional challenge to the facial validity of the Subversive Activities Control Act.
Generally, in non-first amendment cases, a person cannot claim standing in a federal
court to adjudicate the constitutional rights of a third party. Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 255 (1953). In most instances, the court will not allow one to attack a statute
which is constitutional when applied to the challenger on the ground that its application
might be unconstitutional against another person or in another situation. United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21 (1960). See also Yazoo & Miss. R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co.,
226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912). First amendment challenges appear tobe the exception to
this rule. Comment, supra note 124, at 879.
The rationale behind this exception for the first amendment cases is that the over
broad statute, while properly restricting the individual before the Court, might also apply
to others not before the Court who are engaging in protected activity that the law appears
to outlaw. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 722. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional
Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 424 (1974).
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cases limiting the application of the overbreadth doctrine. 167
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 168 a revised view of the overbreadth
doctrine was expressly adopted by the Court. 169 Justice White ana
lyzed a constitutional attack on an Oklahoma statute prohibiting all
civil service employees from engaging in any form of political activ
ity except for those activities involving the right to express privately
an opinion and to cast a vote. 170 The Court, in recognizing that the
overbreadth doctrine is an exception to traditional rules of prac
tice,171 formulated a new, stricter standard. The Court determined
that in situations wherein both conduct and speech are involved, the
overbreadth of the statute must be both real and substantial in rela
tion to the legitimate sweep of the statute. 172 Broadrick restricted the
overbreadth doctrine, and thus eased the burden on the Govern
ment, which, under traditional overbreadth analysis had the heavy
burden to show that the statute did not infringe upon a protected
first amendment right. 173
In light of Broadrick, the question in Agee becomes whether the
overbreadth of the Secretary's regulation 174 is real and substantial in
relation to the Secretary's legitimate authority to regulate travel
within the bounds of due process. Agee submitted an affidavit to the
court of appeals in which he indicated that if he could not speak or
167. One could argue that the Supreme Court's refusal to raise the overbreadth
issue in Agee, even though it was discussed at length in both parties' briefs, may have
been in effect a sub silentio disaffirmance of the doctrine. It is also puzzling that Agee's
attorneys made no mention of the cases which revised the overbreadth doctrine for
clearly this is an obstacle which must be overcome before the analysis will apply.
168. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
169. Id. at 615. The revised view of the overbreadth doctrine first appeared several
years earlier in the dissenting opinion to Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617
21 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
170. 413 U.S. at 602-07 & 603 n.!.
17!. Id. at 615.
172. Id.
173. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 710-12. More recently, the Court in Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), held that a federal statute authorizing the removal or
suspension without pay of tenured government employees "for such cause as will pro
mote the efficiency of the service" was not overbroad. Id. at 162.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, noted that the uncertainty of the scope of the statute
would have a "chilling effect." Id. at 230. Employees would limit their behavior to that
which is unquestionably safe, for "the threat of dismissal from public employment is. . .
a potent means of inhibiting speech . . . . The dismissal standard hangs over their heads
like a sword of Damocles, threatening them with dismissal for any speech that might
impair the 'efficiency of service.' " Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
-174. 22 C.F.R. § 5!.70(b)(4) (1981). See note 30 supra.
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write about the CIA he could not work. 175 Therefore, as a result of
the restriction on his ability to travel, Agee believed that his ability
to exercise his profession had been severely curtailed. The abuse
that Agee claimed he suffered resulted from the application of sec
tion 51. 70(b)(4), which permits passport revocation if the Secretary
determines that the individual is "likely to cause serious damage to
the national security or foreign policy of the United States."176
The judgment the Secretary will exercise in determining
whether a traveler has damaged foreign policy or national security
may often be based on political opinion or commitment to a rigid
viewpoint, as opposed to an objective evaluation of the traveler's ac
tivities and their effect on foreign policy or national security.177
Thus, under the present regulation, the passports of American jour
nalists attempting to gather information about the Bay of Pigs inci
dent or the Vietnam War justifiably could have been revoked. 178 In
addition, the regulation could prevent other critics of national for
eign policy from traveling abroad to influence international opinion
on a number of policy questions. This is the kind of information
that should reach the ears of the national populace in order to allow
it to intelligently undertake the responsibilities of citizenship. 179
Broadrick clearly set out heightened requirements for over
breadth analysis where both conduct and speech are involved, thus it
is arguable whether the Court would have invalidated the Secretary's
regulation following Broadrick's overbreadth analysis} 80 The
Court's sub rosa treatment of this important issue, however, may
have a chilling effect on those who wish to exercise their right to
criticize the government while traveling outside the political bounda
ries of the United States. 181
175. Joint Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 32-34, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280
(1981).
176. See note 72 supra.
177. Brief for Respondent at 106, supra note 150.
178. The Secretary of State made a judgment as to whether journalists' reporting
on the Bay of Pigs and the Vietnam War would endanger national security, and as his
tory shows, the Secretary did not prohibit reporting. /d. at 107-08. On the other hand,
the Secretary did believe that it was necessary to prevent Louis Zemel from traveling to
Cuba following the missile crisis. 381 U.S. at 14-16. In each instance, posterity will
determine whether the Secretary appropriately exercised his judgment.
179. Brief for Respondent at 106, supra note 150.
180. See text accompanying notes 168-76 supra.
181. While it is true that Agee's action appears to be far more damaging to the
national security of the United States than mere criticism could be, there is no reason
why the Court could not have either engaged in an overbreadth analysis or limited the
holding to the specific facts of the case. By doing neither, those travelers who merely
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The Conduct-Speech Dichotomy

The Court employed the dichotomy between conduct and
speech 182 in an attempt to show that only Agee's travel conduct was
inhibited by the revocation of his passport. By introducing this di
chotomy into their analysis, the Court was able to avoid raising the
issues of first amendment violation. The question is whether this di
chotomy is a valid analytical tool, or merely a vehicle to enable the
Court to reach a desired result.
The conduct-speech dichotomy has had an inconsistent devel
opment in first amendment analysis. The Court first applied this dis
tinction with divergent results in the labor picketing cases. 183
Professor Tribe l84 argues that this dichotomy has no real content, for
all communication involves conduct to some degree. 18S The means
or medium of expression, the conduct aspect, is inextricably tied to
the ability of one to communicate. 186 As a majority of cases in this
area involve a mixed conduct-speech situation, the Court has been
reluctant to set out a firm basis for severing the component parts. 187
criticize the government are just as susceptible to action by the Secretary under 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.70(b)(4) as those whose activities are as extreme as Agee's. In effect, Justice Mar
shall's "sword of Damocles," Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,231 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), is hanging over the heads of all Americans who travel abroad.
182. See notes 132-33 supra and accompanying text.
183. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (declaring that peaceful picket
ing was constitutionally protected free speech). COn/ra, Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt,
Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (banning peaceful picketing directed at establishing a "union
shop").
184. Lawrence Tribe is a Professor of Law at Harvard University.
185. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 599.
186. Id.
187. The Court has set no standard for situations in which there is a mixed con
duct-speech situation except that one must look to the nature of the conduct involved and
to the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken. Spence v. Washing
ton, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974).
In Spence, the Court found that a large peace symbol fashioned from removable
tape and temporarily affixed to an American flag was a form of speech protected under
the first amendment and not conduct. Id. at 415. But in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), the Court held that the burning of a draft card was not protected "sym
bolic speech" but rather conduct which could be regulated. Id. at 382. Apparently the
motives of both Spence and O'Brien were to protest against government policies both at
home and abroad.
Finally, in a situation theoretically analogous to Agee, the Court struck down on
first amendment grounds a statute which penalized individuals who expressed their op
position to organized government by displaying "a red flag,. . . as an invitation or stim
ulus to anarchistic action." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 361 (1931). The statute
discussed in Stromberg was aimed at suppressing communication and "could not be sus
tained as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct." 391 U.S. at 382. One could argue
that the regulation in Agee, while not aimed at communication, does in fact restrict com
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This has led Professor Tribe to the conclusion that the conduct
speech dichotomy is not a valid analytical tool for the Court to em
ploy in a situation wherein a restriction on conduct also infringes
upon protected first amendment rights. 188
Use of this result oriented analysis enabled the Agee majority to
declare that Agee's travel was merely conduct and, therefore, was
subject to regulation within the bounds of fifth amendment due pro
cess. Having made the decision to sever Agee's travel conduct from
his speech, the Court then properly argued that only a fifth amend
ment "reasonableness" test need be applied. But the Court's conces
sion that "the revocation of Agee's passport rests in part on the
content of his speech"189 undercuts this position. This statement
does not support the argument that conduct and speech can be
cleanly separated; the statement clearly implies that they overlap.
Recognition that the content of Agee's speech was partially involved
in the decision to revoke his passport should automatically have trig
gered a first amendment analysis.
!fit were solely Agee's travel that the Secretary sought to enjoin,
the fifth amendment standard would have been proper. But the
Court implied that restricting Agee's travel was only a means em
ployed to stifle his speech. It is unlikely that Agee's freedom of
movement would have been restricted if he had been traveling
throughout Europe extolling the virtues of the CIA. Therefore, one
may draw the conclusion that had it not been for Agee's outspoken
hostility toward the CIA and the Government, the Secretary would
not have had grounds to revoke Agee's passport. Agee did not seek
munication, and therefore should not be sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative
conduct.
188. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 600. The Court employed this dichotomy in Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II) and in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963). Both cases involved mass protests by black students in a public place. In each
case there was a large crowd of white onlookers together with a sizable police contingent.
After a lengthy period of surveillance, the police in both cases disbanded the crowds.
While there are significant differences in terms of time and place, the style of the expres
sion was similar; they were ceremonials of protest, not riots. Kelven, The Concept 0/ the
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1,4-6.
Noting the similarities in the facts, the Court characterized the Edwards protest as a
pure exercise of first amendment rights, 372 U.S. at 235-36, while the Cox Court found
that the protest was akin to "mob rule." 379 U.S. at 562. Finding the characterization of
the two courses of conduct to be "strikingly inconsistent," Tribe notes that the distinction
between speech and conduct at best announces a conclusion rather than the analytic
process the Court employed to reach that conclusion. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 600.
189. 453 U.S. at 308. See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
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to escape the law or to violate it. 190 Nor is there a law that specifi
cally curtails the activity engaged in by Agee. 191 There is only a
vague regulation enforceable by the Secretary at his discretion.
This is not to say that Agee's speech is absolutely protected by
the first amendment, for the Government's interest in protecting na
tional security undoubtedly would weigh heavily against Agee even
under a first amendment analysis. On the other hand, the implica
tions of avoiding a plenary discussion of the first amendment ques
tion are far-reaching. The Court has set no standard to limit the
sweep of the Secretary's authority under section S1.70(b)(4). The
potential for abuse thus is present 192 as a consequence of tailoring a
decision to fit the difficult facts presented.
V.

CONCLUSION

Many Americans have strong beliefs about the role of CIA op
erations at home and abroad. Some may think that Agee's form of
housecleaning is necessary to maintain the integrity and credibility
of the United States in the international arena, while many others
believe that Agee and other former CIA agents who have followed a
similar path are not loyal American citizens. While avoiding any
value judgment, this note has attempted to demonstrate that it is vi
tally important from a legal standpoint to discuss fully the doctrines
that any factual situation brings into issue.
In Haig v. Agee,193 facts indicated that the revocation of Agee's
passport pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Secretary may
have been merely a means to stifle his communicative behavior. If
this is so, Agee should have been decided on first amendment
grounds because there is authority indicating that the constitutional
analysis to be afforded an individual whose first amendment rights
have been violated must be more exacting than the analysis em
ployed when only travel is involved.
The Court avoided the first amendment question by returning
190. In fact the Justice Department determined that there were insufficient grounds
for prosecution. See note 21 supra.
191. On June 23, 1982, Congress enacted, and President Reagan signed, see II
WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 829 (June 28, 1982), the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 122 (to
be codified at 50 U.S.c. §§ 421-426). This law imposes criminal penalties on any person
having authorized access to classified information, who intentionally discloses such infor
mation to non-authorized persons, or who learns the identity of a covert agent and inten
tionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent. Id.
192. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text.
193. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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to a dichotomy between speech and conduct and, in doing so, con
cluded that the restriction imposed on Agee affected only his con
duct. Therefore, no first amendment right was violated. The Court
has impliedly given the Secretary an unlimited grant of authority
under his regulation. The Secretary now may rely on Agee as a sig
nal from the Court that it will not interfere in a substantial way
when the Secretary chooses to exercise his discretionary authority in
the area of international travel. Undoubtedly, this at least will di
minish some speech by Americans traveling abroad because the
threat of passport revocation will be present. A full discussion of the
first amendment issue might not have altered the result in Agee, but
it would have provided a safeguard for the American traveler in the
event the Secretary abused his authority to regulate international
travel by American citizens. Agee provides no safeguards against
such potential abuse.
Scott A. Lessne

